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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AS A BAR TO AN ACTION IN
TORT FOR FRAUD
INTRODUCTION

In 1677 the English Parliament enacted the Act for Prevention of
Frauds and Perjuries,1 commonly known as the Statute of Frauds (Statute),2 in an effort to prevent fraudulent enforcement of oral promises.3
The original Statute required certain contracts to be evidenced by a
signed writing,4 on the theory that parol evidence of such transactions
1. 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677). Due in part to England's adoption of the Gregorian
calendar in 1751, some confusion developed over the year in which Parliament enacted
the Statute of Frauds (Statute). See Costigan, The Date And Authorship Of The Statute
Of Frauds,26 Harv. L. Rev. 329, 329-34 (1913). It is generally accepted that the date of
enactment was April 16, 1677. See 6 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 380-83
(1927); Costigan, supra, at 334; Perillo, The Statute Of FraudsIn The Light Of The Functions And Dysfunctions Of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 39 n.1 (1974); Willis, The
Statute Of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 Ind. L.J. 427, 427 (1928).
2. See, eg., Burns v. Gould, 172 Conn. 210, 220, 374 A.2d 193, 199 (1977); Mcintosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 32, 469 P.2d 177, 179 (1970); Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass.
342, 345 (1814); C. Browne, Statute of Frauds vii (5th ed. 1895).
3. See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677) (preamble); Kiely v. St. Germain, - Colo. -, -, 670 P.2d 764, 768 (1983); McIntosh v.
Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 33, 469 P.2d 177, 179 (1970); Deevy v. Porter, I1 NJ. 594, 595,
596, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (1953); C. Browne, supra note 2, at vii; J. Calamnari & J. Perillo,
The Law of Contracts § 19-1, at 672 (2d ed. 1977); 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 275, at 2-3 (1950); W. Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 380, 384; 3 S. Williston, A Treatise
on the Law of Contracts § 448, at 340-41 (3d ed. 1960); Willis, supra note 1, at 427. At
early common law, oral promises were generally not enforced by the King's courts, but
with the advent and expansion of the writ of assumpsit, the enforcement of oral promises
became commonplace and could be obtained on the strength of oral testimony alone. See
J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra, § 19-1, at 672; 2 A. Corbin, supra, § 275, at 2; 3 S.
Williston, supra, § 448, at 340; Perillo, supra note 1, at 67. Equally commonplace, however, became the perpetration of fraud by those who were able to suborn perjured testimony in their favor. See C. Browne, supra note 2, at 4; J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra,
§ 19-1, at 672; 2 A. Corbin, supra, § 275, at 2; 3 S. Williston, supra, § 448, at 340; Note,
Statute of Frauds. Section Seventeen in the light of two and a half centuries, 13 Cornell
L.Q. 303, 305 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Statute of Frauds]. In response to this situation, Parliament enacted the Statute of Frauds. As stated in its recital, the object of the
original Statute was the "prevention of many fraudulent practices, which are commonly
endeavoured to be upheld by pejury and [subornation] of pejury." An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Peruries, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677); see C. Browne, supra note 2, at vii.
4. See An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 4, 17
(1677); C. Browne, supra note 2, at vii, 4; J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-1, at
672-73; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 275, at 2-3; 6 NV. Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 384;
Perillo, supra note 1, at 41, 68-69; see also 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 448, at 340-41
(referring only to writing); Willis, supra note 1, at 427 (same). In addition to the provisions dealing with contracts, the original Statute contained 23 other sections dealing with
conveyances, wills, trusts, and execution of judgments. See An Act for Prevention of
Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 1-3, 5-16, 18-25 (1677); J. Calamari & J. Perillo,supra note 3, § 19-1, at 672; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 275, at 2 n.1; 6 W. Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 384-87; Willis, supra note 1, at 428; see also 3 S. Williston, supra
note 3, § 449, at 347-48 (summarizing selected provisions that require a writing). Today,
the Statute of Frauds typically requires the following contracts to be in writing: various
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tended to be peculiarly susceptible to perjury and therefore inherently
unreliable.'
The Statute's capacity to prevent fraud, however, is not achieved without cost. Just as the Statute precludes a dishonest plaintiff from using
false testimony to invent oral terms or conditions of a nonexistent agreement, 6 so it precludes a genuinely aggrieved plaintiff from enforcing an
oral contract that was in fact made. Far from standing guard against
the perpetration of fraud, in the latter situation the Statute actually sanc-

tions fraud by allowing wrongdoers to break their oral promises with
impunity.' Rarely is the Statute's potential for causing injustice greater
suretyship agreements, agreements in consideration of marriage, agreements for the sale
of land or of interests in land, and contracts not to be performed within one year. See J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, §§ 19-2 to -15, -17 to -25; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3,
chs. 15-17, 19, 20; 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, chs. 16-17. The Uniform Commercial
Code also contains its own Statute of Frauds provisions relating to contracts for the sale
of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-16; 2 A.
Corbin, supra note 3, § 467; 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 506A. For a representative
sampling of various Statutes currently in effect in the United States that are patterned
after the language of the original English Statute, see infra notes 44-46.
5. See Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342, 345 (1814) (original Statute of Frauds was enacted because Parliament found it "inconvenient to depend upon the memory or the integrity of witnesses in disputes relating to real estate"); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y.
230, 234, 135 N.E. 273, 274 (1922) (Cardozo, J.) (policy underlying Statute of Frauds
reflects "[t]he peril of pejury and error [that] is latent in the spoken promise"); C.
Browne, supra note 2, at vii (Statute aims to prevent fraud by precluding litigants from
proving certain transactions by parol evidence, which "experience had shown to be peculiarly liable to corruption," and which therefore was "at best of an uncertain and deceptive character"); see also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-1, at 673 (writing
requirement imposed to preclude perjured testimony); 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 275,
at 3 (same); 6 W. Holdsworth, supra note 1, at 384-93 (same); 3 S. Williston, supra note 3,
§ 452, at 357-60 (promises to answer for debt of another peculiarly susceptible to perjury
because promisor receives no benefit and nothing but promise is of any evidentiary value);
Perillo, supra note 1, at 68-69 (writing requirement imposed to preclude perjured testimony); Statute of Frauds,supra note 3, at 304-05 (same).
6. See Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1957); Deevy v. Porter,
11 N.J. 594, 595-96, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (1953); Friedl v. Benson, 25 Wash. App. 381, 387,
609 P.2d 449, 453 (1980); C. Browne, supra note 2, at vii-viii; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3,
§ 275, at 3; Willis, supra note 1, at 427.
7. See Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Kroger v. Baur, 46
Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Lovely v. Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485,
493, 347 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1984) (Peterson, J., dissenting); Burns v. McCormick, 233
N.Y. 230, 235, 135 N.E. 273, 274-75 (1922); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 191, at 673; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 275, at 3.
8. See Loeb v. Gendel, 23 Ill. 2d 502, 505, 179 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1961); Lovely v.
Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485, 493, 347 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1984) (Peterson, J., dissenting);
Deevy v. Porter, 11 N.J. 594, 596, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (1953); J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
supra note 3, § 19-1, at 673; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 275, at 3, 8 & n.9; 3 S. Williston,
supra note 3, § 448, at 347. Recognizing the Statute's anachronistic nature, Parliament in
1954 deleted all but two provisions of the original Statute of Frauds. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34; see J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
supra note 3, § 19-1, at 674; 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 448, at 340 nn.3-4; Perillo,
supra note 1, at 39-40. Left standing were the two provisions that relate to contracts for
the sale of land and promises to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another.
See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-1, at 674 n.5; 3 S. Williston, supra note 3,
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than when it is pleaded as a defense to an action in tort for fraud based
on an oral promise within the Statute.9
An individual who makes a promise without any intention of perform-

ing it is liable in tort for the harm caused by another's justifiable reliance

thereon.' 0 If the Statute's formal requirements were satisfied, II he would

also be liable in contract for the plaintiff's loss of the bargain.' 2 The issue
that has divided authorities, however, is whether the Statute must be satisfied in order to maintain the tort action. 13 Alternatively stated, the
question is whether the Statute operates as a bar to a tort action predicated on a fraudulent oral promise rendered unenforceable as a contract
by the Statute.' 4
The Statute was enacted to protect innocent persons against false

claims of oral promises.15 Yet in providing this protection, it ought not

to function as a shield for wrongdoers.' 6 A determination that the Stat-

ute either applies or does not apply to a fraud action based on an oral
§ 448, at 340 n.4; Perillo, supra note 1, at 40. Discussion whether American jurisdictions
should also repeal their various Statutes of Frauds is beyond the scope of this Note.
9. See, e.g., Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 533, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922); Munson
v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (1978). In the context of a fraud
claim, the Statute's capacity to cause injustice by immunizing the conduct of a fraudulent
promisor exceeds its capacity to prevent injustice by deterring the fraud of a sham promisee. See infra Pt. I.B..
10. See Kauffman v. Bobo & Wood, 99 Cal. App. 2d 322, 326, 221 P.2d 750, 753
(1950); Sweet v. Kimball, 166 Mass. 332, 335, 44 N.E. 243, 243 (1896); Hunt v. Goodimate Co., 94 N.H. 421, 423, 55 A.2d 75, 77 (1947); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 160,
143 N.E.2d 906, 908, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (1957); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530
comment c (1976); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 105, at 725 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Prosser and Keeton].
But see Brodsky v. Frank, 342 I11. 110, 118-19, 173 N.E. 775, 778 (1930) (tort action
cannot be based on a promissory representation); Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 156, 185
N.E. 856, 858 (1933) (same).
11. The Statute of Frauds typically requires a writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the contract or his authorized agent, that states with reasonable certainty
the identity of both contracting parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the essential terms and conditions of the contract. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3,
§§ 19-29, 19-31; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, §§ 498-500; 4 S. Williston, supra note 3,
§§ 567A-569. The authorities are divided, however, on the question whether the writing
must also state the consideration for the promises constituting the contract. See 2 A.
Corbin, supra note 3, § 501; 4 S. Williston, supra note 3, §§ 570-572.
12. See Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 155, 185 N.E. 856, 858 (1933); Cassidy v.
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 438-39, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530 comment c (1976).
13. General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D. Minn. 1960);
see Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 976-78, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345, 35153 (1984); Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 566, 561 P.2d 805, 813 (1977).
14. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 976, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345,
351-52 (1984); Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (1978);
Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. See Kiely v. St. Germain, -

Colo. -, -,

670 P.2d 764, 768 (1983); Loeb v.

Gendel, 23 IIl. 2d 502, 505, 179 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1961); Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228
N.Y. 447, 457, 127 N.E. 263, 266 (1920) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
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7
promise within the Statute necessarily represents a weighing of risks.'
The result is to promote one policy at the direct expense of the other.' 8
The split in authority on this issue thus reflects a disagreement as to
which type of fraud-that of the promisor or the promisee-poses the
greater threat to the Statute's overall policy of preventing fraud in business dealings.19
Initially, the Statute was held to constitute an absolute bar to an action
at law involving an oral promise within its ambit.20 More recently, however, many courts and commentators, recognizing the potential for injustice inherent in that position, have adopted a more liberal view of the
Statute's operation.2 1 Consequently, the majority of courts today holds
unequivocally that the Statute in no way affects the validity of an action
sounding in tort. 2 Although this approach seeks to vindicate the Stat-

17. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345,
353 (1984); Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Boyd v. Stone,
11 Mass. 342, 349 (1814); American, Inc. v. Bishop, 29 Wash. 2d 95, 98, 185 P.2d 722,
723 (1947).
18. See Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Dung v. Parker,
52 N.Y. 494, 498-99 (1873); American, Inc. v. Bishop, 29 Wash. 2d 95, 98, 185 P.2d 722,
723 (1947). See text accompanying notes 63-73.
19. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 977-78, 203 Cal. Rptr.
345, 353 (1984). Compare Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52
(1941) (fraud plaintiff must bear hardship because to permit claim "would be to nullify
and destroy [the Statute's] wholesome effect and the protection it affords against fraud")
with Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1978) (applying
Statute to bar fraud action would contravene policy of Statute by fostering injustice). See
infra Pt. I.B..
20. See Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Canell v.
Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 159,
185 N.E. 856, 859 (1933); Kiser v. Richardson, 91 Kan. 812, 814, 139 P. 373, 374 (1914);
Sumner v. Fuqua, 182 Ky. 266, 267, 206 S.W. 459, 459 (1918); Dawe v. Morris, 149
Mass. 188, 193, 21 N.E. 313, 314 (1889); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285
Mich. 426, 439, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938); Lewis v. Williams, 186 Miss. 701, 715, 191 So.
479, 482 (1939); State ex rel Fletcher v. Blair, 352 Mo. 476, 483, 178 S.W.2d 322, 325
(1944); McIntyre v. Dawes, 71 Mont. 367, 375-76, 229 P. 846, 849 (1924); Dung v.
Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 497 (1873); Ossage v. Foley, 20 Ohio App. 16, 18, 153 N.E. 117,
118 (1923); Barry v. Wixon, 22 R.I. 16, 16, 46 A. 42, 42 (1900) (per curiam); American,
Inc. v. Bishop, 29 Wash. 2d 95, 97-98, 185 P.2d 722, 723 (1947); see also Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 727-29 (5th Cir. 1957) (interpreting Georgia law). But see Zuckerman v. Cochran, 229 Ala. 484, 486, 158 So. 324, 326 (1934); Nanos v. Harrison, 97
Conn. 529, 533-35, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922); Schleifer v. Worcester N. Say. Inst., 306
Mass. 226, 229, 27 N.E.2d 992, 994-95 (1940); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354,
361-62, 55 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1936); Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 146
(Tex. 1931); see also Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 680-81, 684
(E.D.S.C. 1940) (interpreting South Carolina law).
21. See infra note 22.
22. See, e.g., Campbell v. Regal Typewriter Co., 341 So. 2d 120, 125 (Ala. 1976);
Dobison v. Bank of Hawaii, 60 Hawaii 225, 226, 587 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978) (per
curiam); Schulz v. Coleman, 473 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Mo. 1971); Munson v. Raudonis, 118
N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1978); Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J.
576, 584-85, 127 A.2d 13, 18 (1956); Paul J. Cowley & Assocs. v. Comtax, Inc., 100
A.D.2d 744, 744, 473 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (1984); Kent v. Humphries, 303 N.C. 675, 679,
281 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530 comment c (1976); see also
Walker v. U-Haul Co., 734 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Mississippi law).
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ute's policy of preventing fraud,23 it ignores the concomitant policy

against the enforcement of certain oral contracts 2 4-- a policy that might
be undermined if a claimant is permitted to maintain the action in tort. 5
Both extreme positions on the issue forfeit one prong of the Statute's
antifraud policy in favor of the other.

Accordingly, a few states reject both of these approaches and look instead to the measure of damages sought in the fraud action to determine

whether the Statute of Frauds should apply. 26 Under this analysis, a
claim for out of pocket damages would indicate that the claim truly

sounds in tort,27 thereby permitting use of parol evidence.28 Conversely,

a claim for benefit of the bargain damages, a typical contractual rem-

edy,29 would be dismissed as an attempt at indirect enforcement of an
Some older authorities adhering to this view remain good law. See, eg., Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 533-35, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922); Schleifer v. Worcester N. Say. Inst.,
306 Mass. 226, 229, 27 N.E.2d 992, 994-95 (1940); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or.
354, 361-63, 55 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1936). A substantial minority of jurisdictions still adheres to the view that the Statute of Frauds bars an action for fraud based on an oral
promise within its ambit. See, eg., Lininger v. Sonenblick, 23 Ariz. App. 266, 269, 532
P.2d 538, 541 (1975); Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 353 (1984); Ostman v. Lawn, 305 So. 2d 871, 872-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974); American Standard, Inc. v. Jesse, 150 Ga. App. 663, 665-66, 258 S.E.2d 240, 244
(1979); Mildfelt v. Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 568, 561 P.2d 805, 814-15 (1977); see also
Glenway Indus. v. Wheelbrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (interpreting Pennsylvania law).
23. See Dobison v. Bank of Hawaii, 60 Hawaii 225, 226, 587 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978)
(per curiam); Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1978).
24. See Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1957); Kroger v. Baur,
46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d
849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 159, 185 N.E. 856, 859 (1933); Dawe
v. Morris, 149 Mass. 188, 193, 21 N.E. 313, 314 (1889); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 438-39, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494,
498-500 (1873); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 378, 55 P.2d 1122, 1131 (1936)
(Rossman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Wade v. State Nat'l Bank, 379
S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
25. See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.
26. See, e-g., Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170, 177-78 (1856); Collins v. McCombs, 511
S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 413, 274
P. 856, 859-60 (1929).
27. See Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170, 178 (1856); Hastings v. Houston Shell &
Concrete Co., 596 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Collins v. McCombs, 511
S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 413, 274
P. 856, 859-60 (1929); see, eg., Welch, 32 Miss. at 177 (because plaintiff sought to recover
only out of pocket expenses, action sounded in tort and was therefore permitted); Hastings, 596 S.W.2d at 144 (same).
28. See Cobbledick-Kibbe Glass Co. v. Pugh, 161 Cal. App. 2d 123, 126, 326 P.2d
197, 199 (1958); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 161, 143 N.E.2d 906, 908.09, 164
N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1957); Bareham & McFarland, Inc. v. Kane, 228 A.D. 396, 401, 240
N.Y.S. 123, 130 (1930); 3 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 580, at 431; 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2439, at 128 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Sweet, PromissoryFraudand the ParolEvidence Rule, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 877, 877 (1961).
29. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 14-4; 5 A. Corbin, supra note 3,
§ 992; D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 12.1, at 786 (1973); 11 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 1338, at 198. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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oral contract.3 °
This remedial approach is the most feasible solution in states that measure fraud damages according to the out of pocket rule, 3 1 but it is useless
in states that follow the benefit of the bargain rule32 or permit recovery of
contract-type damages, such as lost profits, as consequential fraud damages.33 In those states, it would be impossible to ascertain the gravamen
of the claim by looking at the requested relief.34 Moreover, if a tort has
been committed, it makes little sense to nonsuit the victim merely because he has pleaded an improper measure of damages.35

Any rule resolving this dispute must necessarily sacrifice some of the
deterrence against fraud provided by either the Statute 36 or the common
law fraud action.3 7 This Note argues that courts should preserve as
much of the deterrence value of both the Statute and the fraud action as
30. See Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170, 178 (1856); Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d
745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 413, 274 P. 856,
859-60 (1929); see, eg., Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 45-46 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (dismissing tort claim as attempt at indirect enforcement of oral contract
because plaintiff sought to recover amount he would have earned had oral contract been
performed); Collins, 511 S.W.2d at 747 (same); Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 390-91,
295 P.2d 332, 335 (1956) (dismissing fraud claim as indirect contract action because
claimant's loss resulted from loss of bargain and not from any expense incurred in reliance on misrepresentations as to title of property); Papanikolas,73 Utah at 413, 274 P. at
859-60 (dismissing fraud claim as indirect contract action because amount of damages
sought under fraud claim identical to amount sought under contract claim). Texas has
very recently added the requirement that plaintiff prove an additional misrepresentation-one that is collateral to the oral promise--in order to maintain the fraud action.
See Weinacht v. Phillips Coal Co., 673 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex. App. 1984); see also
Keriotis, 607 S.W.2d at 46 (fraud claim dismissed because plaintiff sought benefit of the
bargain damages and failed to allege a collateral agreement).
31. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
34. Because the standard measure of damages for breach of contract is the benefit of
the bargain rule, see supra note 29, the amount of damages sought in a fraud action in a
benefit of the bargain state would be identical to the amount sought in an action to enforce the contract. See General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184 F. Supp. 231, 235
(D. Minn. 1960).
35. A complaint cannot be dismissed simply because the plaintiff prays for relief to
which he is not entitled. Lipsit v. Leonard, 64 N.J. 276, 286, 315 A.2d 25, 30 (1974);
Rosenwald v. Goldfein, 3 A.D.2d'206, 209-10, 159 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1957); Thompson
v. Hunstead, 53 Wash. 2d. 87, 91, 330 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1958). The proper course of
action is to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his claim and, if he is successful, to
limit his recovery to the proper amount. Lipsit, 64 N.J. at 286, 315 A.2d at 30; Rosenwald, 3 A.D.2d at 209-10, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 337; see Thompson, 53 Wash. 2d at 91-92, 330
P.2d at 1009-10.
36. See, e.g., Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1957) (denying
fraud action because Statute's deterrence value would be imperiled); Munoz v. Kaiser
Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345, 353 (1984) (same); Dung v.
Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 498-99 (1873) (same). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
37. See, eg., Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474,478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1978)
(sustaining common law fraud action notwithstanding Statute of Frauds); Kent v. Humphries, 303 N.C. 675, 679, 281 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1981) (same); Sibley v. Southland Life Ins.
Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1931) (same); cf Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson,
494 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. App. 1972) (because "man will discover some way to use the
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possible, without abrogating to any significant degree the Statute's mandate against enforcement of certain oral contracts. Part I of this Note

examines the competing policies embodied in the Statute and concludes
that the Statute should not operate to bar tort actions predicated on oral

promises. Part II proposes the following compromise rule: When a
fraud action is based solely on an oral promise within the Statute of

Frauds, the plaintiff may recover only his out of pocket losses incurred in
reliance thereon, regardless of the usual measure of fraud damages.

When the plaintiff can prove a collateral misrepresentation, however, he
can recover the usual amount of damages the jurisdiction allows for
fraud. Although this rule presents two risks-undercompensating a true
victim of fraud, and compensating a sham plaintiff, with the commensurate harm to a defendant fully within his rights in not performing an oral
promise-this Note concludes that these risks are preferable to the
greater risks of promoting fraud inherent in the other approaches.
I.

SHOULD THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS OPERATE AS A

BAR TO A

FRAUD AcTION?

A.

The Language of the Statutes of Frauds

There are several different versions of the Statute of Frauds"8 and,
although the underlying policies are identical,39 the effect of noncompliance with the Statute's writing requirement is neither uniformly stated 4°
nor uniformly interpreted.4' Consequently, the terms of the different
Statutes do not clearly delimit the scope of the Statute's operation. For

this reason, semantic analysis is not helpful in determining whether the
Statute applies to a fraud action based on an oral promise within its ambit.42 Nevertheless, many courts ostensibly resolve the issue by interpretvery law established to prevent frauds to protect one," common law fraud action is necessary supplement to Statute of Frauds).
38. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Kiely v. St. Germain, - Colo.-, -, 670 P.2d 764, 768 (1983); Burns v.
Gould, 172 Conn. 210, 217, 374 A.2d 193, 199 (1977); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153
Or. 354, 377-78, 55 P.2d 1122, 1131 (1936) (Rossman, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
40. See C. Browne, supra note 2, § 115, at 137-38; J. Calamari &J. Perillo, supra note
3, §19-35, at 723; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 279, at 19-20; 3 S.Williston, supra note 3,
§§ 525-526A, at 695-708. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
41. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-35, at 724; 2 A. Corbin, supra note
3, § 279; 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 527; Note, Statute ofFrauds:Evaluation of underlying theories, 14 Cornell L.Q. 102, 103 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Underlying Theories].
See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
42. Authorities warn against relying extensively on the language of the applicable
Statute of Frauds provision in ambiguous situations. See C. Browne, supra note 2, § 115,
at 137-38 (because policy underlying these provisions is identical, "[courts] should not be
justified in laying too much stress" upon semantic distinctions); 2 A. Corbin, supra note
3, § 279, at 20 ("It may be that in a few instances, the operation of the statute ...turns
upon the special form of words adopted; but it is clear that the use of such words as 'void'
and 'rule of evidence' in stating the effect of the statute ... is almost always erroneous."); Underlying Theories, supra note 41, at 103 ("[tlhe problem cannot be solved on
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The semantic debate focuses primarily on the words "void"' and "invalid,"45 and on the phrase "no action shall be brought."" Courts that
construe the Statute both as a substantive rule of law and as a statement
of public policy47 interpret these terms to mean that an oral promise is a

nullity for all purposes and may not be used to support any cause of
action, whether in contract or tort.48 Because the plaintiff in a promissory fraud action is compelled to make the void promise a part of his
the basis of subtle distinctions in wording; there is no uniformity in the judicial interpretation of critical phrases" such as "void," "invalid," or "no action"). See infra notes 4462 and accompanying text.
43. See, eg., Ostman v. Lawn, 305 So. 2d 871, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (per
curiam); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 500 (1873); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or.
354, 361, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1936).
44. E.g., Ala. Code § 8-9-2 (1984); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 38-10-108, 38-10-112 (1982);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 566.132 (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §§ 5-701,
5-703 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984); Or. Rev. Stat. § 41.580 (1981); Utah Code Ann.
§§ 25-5-3, 25-5-4 (1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.36.010 (1978).
45. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985); Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2903 (1983).
46. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-101 (1967); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 725.01 (West Supp.
1984); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 656-1 (1976 & Supp. 1983); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 59, §§ 1, 2
(Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1984); Ind. Code Ann. § 32-2-1-1 (Burns 1973); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 33-106 (1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 371.010 (1972 & Supp. 1984); Md. Real Prop.
Code Ann. § 5-104 (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 259, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980);
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1 (1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 432.010 (Vernon 1952); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 25: 1-5 (West 1940); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1335.05 (Page 1979); Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 33, § 3 (Purdon 1967); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-4 (1969); S.C. qode Ann. § 32-3-10
(Law. Co-op. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101 (1980); Va. Code§ 11-2 (1978). Other
statutes phrase this proscription as "no action shall be maintained." See, e.g., Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-550 (West Supp. 1984); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 513.01 (West 1947);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 506:1-506:2 (1983). North Carolina's Statute of Frauds provisions contain both "void," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2 (1965), and "no action shall be
brought," id. § 22-1, langauge.
47. The Statute of Frauds is substantive in that it determines in large degree the legal
effect and value of agreements that do not comply with its requirements. See 2 A.
Corbin, supra note 3, § 294, at 73. Under this approach to the Statute's operation, "[t]he
writing is a necessary constituent of any legal obligation; without it there is nothing."
Underlying Theories, supra note 41, at 105; see Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. William D.
Mullen Co., 7 F.2d 470, 471-72 (D. Del. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.2d 885 (3d
Cir. 1926); Jamerson v. Logan, 228 N.C. 540, 544, 46 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1948); see, e.g.,
Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Ostman v. Lawn, 305
So. 2d 871, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849,
851 (Fla. 1953); McIntyre v. Dawes, 71 Mont. 367, 375-76, 229 P. 846, 849 (1924); Dung
v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 500 (1873); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 377-78, 55
P.2d 1122, 1131 (1936) (Rossman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Gogel v.
Blazofsky, 187 Pa. Super. 32, 36-37, 142 A.2d 313, 315 (1958); Wade v. State Nat'l Bank,
379 S.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); American, Inc. v. Bishop, 29 Wash. 2d
95, 96-97, 185 P.2d 722, 722-23 (1947).
48. See, e.g., Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803-04, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941)
("invalid" means oral contract invalid for all purposes); Ostman v. Lawn, 305 So. 2d 871,
872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ("no action" means no claim may be brought that requires
proof of oral promise); American, Inc. v. Bishop, 29 Wash. 2d 95, 98, 185 P.2d 722, 72223 (1947) ("void" means oral promise cannot be basis for recovery in either contract or
tort).
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case, he must subject his tort claim to the Statute.4 9 Under this literal
interpretation, the Statute precludes any action either directly or indirectly related to the oral promise.50
When the Statute is construed as a rule of evidence, 51 however, it does
52
not operate as an absolute bar to a claim based on an oral promise.
Courts adhering to this theory interpret the words "void" and "no ac-

tion" to mean that the oral promise is merely unenforceable. 5 Accord-

ing to this interpretation, the Statute bars an action to enforce the
contract but permits a promissory fraud action,' on the theory that the
Statute does not preclude testimony of an oral promise offered solely for
the limited evidentiary purpose of establishing an element of a tort
action. 5
49. See McIntyre v. Dawes, 71 Mont. 367, 375, 229 P. 846, 849 (1924); Dung v.
Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 500 (1873).
50. See, e.g., Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Burgdorfer
v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 377-78, 55 P.2d 1122, 1131 (1936) (Rossman, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); Wade v. State Nat'l Bank, 379 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964).
51. According to the evidentiary theory, the Statute simply requires that certain contracts be evidenced by a signed writing; it does not condemn as nonexistent any contract
not so evidenced. See, eg., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 681-82
(E.D.S.C. 1940); Moore v. Culpepper, 397 So. 2d 108, 110 (Ala. 1981); Wood v. Lett, 195
Ala. 601, 603, 71 So. 177, 179 (1916); Troj v. Chesebro, 30 Conn. Supp. 30, 32, 296 A.2d
685, 686 (Super. Ct. 1972); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa
1971); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 285, 286 A.2d 95, 97 (1972); Corder v.
O'Neill, 176 Mo. 401, 436-37, 75 S.W. 764, 774 (1903); Crane v. Powell, 139 N.Y. 379,
384, 34 N.E. 911, 912 (1893); Golden v. Golden, 273 Or. 506, 509, 541 P.2d 1397, 1399
(1975); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 361, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1936); Underlying Theories, supra note 41, at 105.
Courts that adhere to this theory tend to limit the Statute's application when a party
seeks to prove an oral contract for purposes other than its enforcement. See Daugherty,
264 Md. at 285, 286 A.2d at 97. For example, in a quasi-contractual suit, the oral contract can be proved to show that performance was not rendered as a gift. See Downey v.
Guilfoile, 96 Conn. 384, 386, 114 A. 73, 74 (1921). The oral contract is also admissible
and fully operative in collateral actions against a third party. See Kaufhold v. Taylor,
360 Pa. 372, 375-76, 61 A.2d 813, 814 (1948). For further examples of situations in
which courts allow proof of an oral contract within the Statute, see 2 A. Corbin, supra
note 3, § 288, at 49-53, and cases cited therein.
52. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 681-82 (E.D.S.C.
1940); Corder v. O'Neill, 176 Mo. 401, 436-37, 75 S.W. 764, 774 (1903); Burgdorfer v.
Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 361, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1936).
53. See, e.g., Moore v. Culpepper, 397 So. 2d 108, 109 (Ala. 1981) (interpreting
"void" to mean unenforceable); Troj v. Chesebro, 30 Conn. Supp. 30, 31, 296 A.2d 685,
686 (Super. Ct. 1972) (interpreting "no action" to mean no action for direct enforcement
of oral contract); Golden v. Golden, 273 Or. 506, 509-11, 541 P.2d 1397, 1399 (1975)
(interpreting "void" to mean unenforceable).
54. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D.S.C.
1940); Corder v. O'Neill, 176 Mo. 401, 437, 75 S.W. 764, 774 (1903); J.Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-35, at 724; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 288, at 49.
55. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 681-82 (E.D.S.C.
1940); Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 533, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922); Corder v. O'Neill,
176 Mo. 401, 436-37, 75 S.W. 764, 774 (1903); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann, 153 Or. 354,
361, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1936).
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Under

this theory, the Statute bars enforcement of oral promises unless certain
conditions are satisfied5 7 but, significantly, treats the oral promise as
valid for most other purposes.5 8 Consequently, it would be permissible
to introduce parol evidence of one element of a possibly valid contractthe promise to perform-for the limited purpose of proving the tort element that the promise was made with a fraudulent intent, 59 because
proof of this fact would not entitle the plaintiff to any contractual enforcement remedy.'
The plain language of the various Statutes of Frauds is susceptible to
contrary interpretations, 6 1 none of them conclusive or particularly helpful in resolving the conffict.6 2 Indeed, courts that attempt to rely on the
language often get entangled in a semantic thicket, and the results are
often unnecessarily inconsistent, if not illogical. Consequently, an analysis of the policy concerns underlying the Statute is dispositive in determining whether and under what circumstances an action for fraud may
be based on an oral promise within the Statute.
B.

The Policy Debate

Although the Statute of Frauds was specifically enacted to deter fraudulent claims of oral promises,63 its overriding purpose is to prevent fraud
in any form. 64 The Statute's antifraud policy thus embraces two disso-

nant components: the express legislative prohibition against enforcement
56. Under the remedial theory, the Statute operates solely as a limitation upon a
court's discretion to grant a contractual enforcement remedy: Specific performance or
breach damages cannot be granted unless certain conditions are met. See, e.g., Grossman
v. Levy's, Inc., 81 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 1955); Kludt v. Connett, 350 Mo. 793, 804-05,
168 S.W.2d 1068, 1073 (1943); Murphy v. Nolte & Co., 226 Va. 76, 81, 307 S.E.2d 242,
245 (1983); 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 279, at 20, § 294, at 72-73; Underlying Theories,
supra note 41, at 105.
57. See supra note 11.
58. See, eg., Rice v. Insurance & Bonds, Inc., 366 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(proof of oral contract permitted to prove ownership of accounts for purpose of establishing element of conversion claim), cert. dismissed, 372 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1979); Murphy v.
Nolte & Co., 226 Va. 76, 82-83, 307 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1983) (proof of oral contract term
permitted despite existence of contradictory term in written memorandum used to satisfy
the Statute). Whether a court adheres to the evidentiary theory or to the remedial theory,
the result is the same as long as enforcement of the oral contract is not sought. See supra
note 51.
59. See Schenley Distillers Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678, 681 (E.D.S.C. 1940);
Corder v. O'Neill, 176 Mo. 401, 436-37, 75 S.W. 764, 774 (1903); Burgdorfer v.
Thielemann, 153 Or. 354, 361, 55 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1936).
60. Although proof of the false oral promise is essential to a successful fraud action, it
alone does not entitle the plaintiff to receive either damages or a decree of specific performance for its breach. See infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text.
64. See Dobison v. Bank of Hawaii, 60 Hawaii 225, 226, 587 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978)
(per curiam); Bennett v. Horton, 592 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1979); Friedl v. Benson, 25
Wash. App. 381, 387, 609 P.2d 449, 453 (1980).
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of certain oral contracts6" and the implied judicial caveat against invocation of the Statute to shield fraudulent conduct. 6 Authorities that view
the Statute as an absolute bar to promissory fraud claims emphasize the

former component and reason that to permit such claims would in effect

nullify the Statute.67 Although the Statute's continued existence might

evidence legislative intent to apply it in any action related to an oral
promise within its ambit,6 8 courts sensitive to the Statute's potential for
sanctioning fraud have developed many devices in contract actions for
"taking the case outside" the Statute.6 9 Accordingly, courts frequently

exercise their discretion when application of the Statute might result in
the very fraud it was enacted to prevent. 70 The possibility of such a paradoxical result increases dramatically in the context of a fraud action.

A fraud action based on an oral promise within the Statute necessitates

a balancing of valid but conflicting policy concerns. 7 ' Although those
who construe the Statute to bar the fraud action present formidable arguments in support of their position,72 this balancing militates in favor of
permitting the action.7 3
65. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 16, infra note 76 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941);
Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 439-40, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938);
Burgdorfer v. Thielermann, 153 Or. 354, 378, 55 P.2d 1122, 1131 (1936) (Rossman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
68. See Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803-04, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Boone
v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 239, 154 S.W. 900, 903 (1913); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 439-40, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938); Deevy v. Porter, I1 NJ. 594,
595, 95 A.2d 596, 597 (1953); Meyer v. Texas Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 424 S.W.2d 417,
426 (Tex. 1968); 3 S. Williston, supra note 3, § 448, at 345.
69. See Kiely v. St. Germain, - Colo. -, -, 670 P.2d 764, 768 (1983); Weale v.
Massachussetts Gen. Hous. Corp., 117 N.H. 428, 431-32, 374 A.2d 925, 928 (1977);
Yucca Mining & Petroleum Co. v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 69 N.M. 281, 286, 365
P.2d 925, 929 (1961). Among the devices are promissory estoppel, see Kiely, - Colo. at
-, 670 P.2d at 768, part performance, see Weale, 117 N.H. at 431-32, 374 A.2d at 928,
and equitable estoppel, see Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 163, 103 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952).
70. See Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1891); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 35-37, 469 P.2d 177, 180 (1970); Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Medical
Center, 264 Or. 200, 202-03, 504 P.2d 749, 750 (1972); Miller v. McCamish, 78 Wash. 2d
821, 824-25, 479 P.2d 919, 921 (1971); see also Sunset-Sternau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 60 Cal.
2d 834, 838, 389 P.2d 133, 136, 36 Cal. Rptr. 741, 744 (1964) ("If the extent of [the
Statute of Frauds'] coverage is unclear, however, we know of no policy reasons which
compel a resolution of the ambiguity in favor of its wide application.") (footnote omitted); 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 279, at 19 ("Like the United States Constitution, the
statute of frauds is the product not only of those who drafted and enacted it, but also of
those who have interpreted and applied it."). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Co-p., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345,
353 (1984) (concluding that "more mischief would be done than benefit would be gained"
by allowing fraud claim based on oral promise within Statute of Frauds); cf Kiely v. St.
Germain, - Colo. -, -, 670 P.2d 764, 768-70 (1983) (balancing policies underlying
doctrine of promissory estoppel and statute of frauds "to prevent use of the statute to
effect inequitable results"). See supra notes 15-19, infra notes 74-104 and accompanying
text.
72. See infra notes 77, 89-90, 97 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
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Courts will best serve the Statute's antifraud policy by admitting parol
evidence of a misrepresentation despite the unenforceability of the underlying contract. If the Statute is not to be used as a vehicle for fraud, it
must not be peremptorily invoked to bar an action in tort for fraud.
Such a broad application of the Statute would subvert its purpose by
immunizing the fraudulent conduct it was enacted to prevent. 74 Moreover, courts should not allow a fraudfeasor to escape liability for his tortious conduct merely because he chose an oral promise as the means for
perpetrating the fraud.7 5 If a fraud action could never be based on an
oral promise within the Statute, corrupt entrepreneurs would be enthe
couraged to structure their schemes around oral "agreements" within
6
Statute, thus clearly frustrating the Statute's antifraud policy.7
Nevertheless, opponents of the fraud claim argue that permitting the
action will allow any unscrupulous person to circumvent the Statute simply by labeling his claim a tort.77 That concern, albeit valid,78 is exaggerated. Merely labeling the claim a tort does not establish a valid cause of
action for fraud.7 9 The rigorously applied requirements of a fraud
74. See Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 532-35, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922); Munson v.
Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1978); Channel Master Corp. v.
Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 408, 151 N.E.2d 833, 836, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259,
263 (1958).

75. See Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1931) ("Responsibility for the tort committed is not affected by the fact that the false promise was made
orally.").
76. See Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 533, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922) ("If the action
will not lie because this contract of lease was parol, the statute of frauds, which was
intended to prevent fraud, will serve as an aid in helping to perpetrate a fraud."); Munson
v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 478, 387 A.2d 1174, 1176 (1978) ("Barring an action in
deceit because of the Statute of Frauds, however, would not further the policy of the
statute. Quite the contrary, it would foster an injustice."). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
77. See Glenway Indus. v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 686 F.2d 415, 418 (6th Cir. 1982)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law); Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir.
1957) (interpreting Georgia law); Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803-04, 117 P.2d
50, 52 (1941); Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Sachs v.
Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 158, 185 N.E. 856, 859 (1933); Dawe v. Morris, 149 Mass. 188,
190-91, 21 N.E. 313, 314 (1889); Boyd v. Stone, 11 Mass. 342, 348 (1814); Cassidy v.
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 440, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938); Club Chain
of Manhattan Ltd. v. Christopher & Seventh Gourmet, Ltd., 74 A.D.2d 277, 285, 427
N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (1980); Burgdorfer v. Thielemann 153 Or. 354, 377-78, 55 P.2d 1122,
1131 (1936) (Rossman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Wade v. State Nat'l
Bank, 379 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 391,
295 P.2d 332, 336 (1956); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 7.10, at 573
(1956). One court even went so far as to state that allowing the fraud claim would effectively repeal the Statute of Frauds, and that "in so acting the courts. . . would be guilty
of an unconstitutional invasion of legislative powers." Cassidy, 285 Mich. at 439, 280
N.W. at 819. Professors Harper and James regard the promissory fraud action as an
attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds through a "northwest passage." 1F. Harper
& F. James, supra, § 7.10, at 573.
78. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Lininger v. Sonenblick, 23 Ariz. App. 266, 267-68, 532 P.2d 538, 53940
(1975); Dobison v. Bank of Hawaii, 60 Hawaii 225, 226 n.1, 587 P.2d 1234, 1235 n.1
(1978) (per curiam); Mountain Fir Lumber Co. v. Employee Benefits Ins. Co., 64 Or.
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claim8 ° provide substantial protection against facile circumvention of the

Statute and its objectives."' For example, reliance on an oral promise

may be unreasonable in a given case;8 2 in that event, the court can hold
that the "justifiable reliance" element of the fraud claim has not been
established. 3 Dismissing the claim on this narrow ground is preferable
to a broad rule barring all such claims without regard to their individual
merit." In addition, the plaintiff in a promissory fraud action assumes a
heavy burden to prove that the defendant had no intention of performing
the promise at the time he made it.8" Because fraudulent intent may not
be inferred from nonperformance alone,86 this burden affords substantial
protection against spurious claims.8 7
App. 312, -, 667 P.2d 567, 572, rev'd on other grounds, 296 Or. 639, 679 P.2d 296
(1983); see also Biggs v. Marsh, - Ind. App. -, -, 446 N.E.2d 977, 982 (1983) (evidence to establish elements of fraud differs substantially from evidence necessary to sustain breach of contract claim).
80. The essential elements of an action for fraudulent misrepresentation are: a representation by defendant of some material existing fact; falsity of such representation;
defendant's knowledge of its falsity (scienter); plaintiff s justifiable reliance on such representation; and injury incurred by plaintiff as a result of such justifiable reliance. See, eg.,
Lininger v. Sonenblick, 23 Ariz. App. 266, 267, 532 P.2d 538, 539 (1975); Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J. 576, 585-86, 127 A.2d 13, 18 (1956); Channel Master Corp.
v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 406-07, 151 N.E.2d 833, 834-35, 176
N.Y.S.2d 259, 262-63 (1958); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 10, § 105, at 728.
81. See Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J. 576, 586, 127 A.2d 13, 18 (1956)
(Statute of Frauds not bar to tort action for deceit, but "[t]he burden of proof is not a
light one to sustain"); Keeton, Fraud-StatementsOf Intention, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 185, 201
(1936) (burden of proof on fraud plaintiff to show more than mere broken promise provides safeguard against "too many trumped up contracts"); see, e-g., Trollope v. Koerner,
106 Aria. 10, 19, 470 P.2d 91, 100 (1970) (fraud claim dismissed due to lack of fraudulent
intent and failure to plead with required particularity); Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass.
102, 110-12, 162 N.E. 4, 7 (1928) (Statute said to be no bar to fraud claim, but plaintiff
failed to prove injurious reliance).
82. See, e.g., Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 18, 470 P.2d 91, 100 (1970); Des
Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 112, 162 N.E. 4, 7 (1928); Beck v. New York News, Inc.,
92 A.D.2d 823, 825, 460 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328, aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 620, 459 N.E.2d 1287, 471
N.Y.S.2d 850 (1983).
83. See supra note 82.
84. For a discussion of the commercial necessities of allowing tort actions based on
oral promises, see infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
85. See Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 22 N.J 576, 585-86, 127 A.2d 13, 18 (1956);
Keeton, supra note 81, at 202. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530 comment d (1976); Prosser and Keeton,
supra note 10, § 109, at 764; Keeton, supra note 81, at 202. The successful promissory
fraud plaintiff must show, in addition to nonperformance of the promise, circumstances
that imply an intent not to perform, such as: evidence of insolvency or some other reason
for defendant to know from the outset that he cannot perform, Prosser and Keeton, supra
note 10, § 109, at 764-65; repudiation of the promise very soon after it is made with no
intervening change of position by either party, such as entering into a better deal or
suffering an unforeseeable supervening inability to perform, id. at 765; failure to make
any attempt at performance or preparation therefor, &L; or continued assurances of performance after it is clear defendant will not or cannot perform, as where the subject
premises have already been leased or sold to another, id.
87. See Keeton, supra note 81, at 202. Professor Keeton asserts that objective circumstances that tend to show an intention not to perform a promise also tend to show
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The significant role of oral representations in commercial practice also
militates in favor of permitting the fraud action. If the law is not to
discourage the business community from capitalizing on the advantages
of oral communication, 8" it must provide some relief from the risk of
being defrauded by someone taking refuge in the Statute of Frauds. Opponents of the fraud action, however, argue that businesspersons are presumed to know the law8 9 and that they therefore, as a matter of law, have
no right to rely on a promise that the law declared to be unenforceable or
9
void when made.9" This reasoning ignores the realities of commerce. 1
that there was no contract at all. See id. at 202. Accordingly, there is less likelihood of
"enforcing" an oral contract invented by a dishonest claimant. Id. This heavy burden of
proof, however, does not guarantee that a spurious claim will never succeed. See id.
Therefore, in order to minimize gains that a plaintiff might derive from bringing a spurious claim, this Note proposes that the plaintiff's recovery should be limited in most cases
to his out of pocket losses. See infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
88. See Yucca Mining & Petroleum Co. v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 69 N.M. 281,
287, 365 P.2d 925, 929 (1961) ("swift pace of modem business life" made it unrealistic to
require board of directors to issue formal written resolution authorizing president to
modify contract within Statute); Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should
It Be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 829 (1950) ("the requirement of a signed writing has
been at odds with the established habits of men, a habit of reliance upon the spoken word
in increasing millions of cases"); Statute of Frauds,supra note 3, at 306 (asserting that
changing business conditions and commercial practices cause business persons to make
contracts on basis of convenience and not on basis of Statute). But see Perillo, supra note
1, at 70 (although acknowledging argument that Statute is inconvenient and may slow
pace of business, nevertheless doubts that such effects are significant).
89. See, eg., Owens v. Foundation for Ocean Research, 107 Cal. App. 3d 179, 184,
165 Cal. Rptr. 571, 573 (1980); Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 804, 117 P.2d 50, 52
(1941); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 437, 280 N.W. 814, 819
(1938); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 498 (1873). But see Statute of Frauds,supra note 3,
at 307 (arguing that modem businesspersons cannot be presumed to know all formal
statutory requirements that apply to all their numerous daily contracts).
90. See Owens v. Foundation for Ocean Research, 107 Cal. App. 3d 179, 184, 165
Cal. Rptr. 571, 573 (1980); Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 804, 117 P.2d 50, 52
(1941); Sachs v. Blewett, 206 Ind. 151, 158, 185 N.E. 856, 859 (1933); Boyd v. Stone, 11
Mass. 342, 349 (1814); Byers v. Zuspan, 241 Mo. App. 1103, 1117, 264 S.W.2d 944, 949
(1954); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 500 (1873); see also Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz.
10, 18, 470 P.2d 91, 99 (1970) (finding reliance on oral promise within Statute justifiable
"would frustrate the basic policy and effect of the . . . Statute").
In states in which legislatures have already prescribed the manner in which transactions should be consummated, courts arguably have no authority to license a practice that
contravenes that prescription. See, e.g., Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 166-67, 103 N.E.2d
485, 489 (1952); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 438-40, 280 N.W.
814, 819 (1938); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 498-99 (1873). Consequently, proponents
of this view assert that merchants who pursue business methods other than those prescribed by law operate at their own risk; they therefore conclude that if the enforcement
of the law creates a peril to the nation's business structure, the remedy lies with the
legislature, not the judiciary. See Ozier, 411 Ill. at 166-67, 103 N.E.2d at 489; Cassidy,
285 Mich. at 439, 280 N.W. at 819. However, "[t]he mind of man is infinite in its contrivances. No matter what laws are written for the purpose of preventing fraud, in time,
man will discover some way to use the very law established to prevent frauds to protect
one." Southern States Dev. Co. v. Robinson, 494 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1972). As Justice Cardozo admonished the legal profession many years ago, "[i]f we were
to state the law today as well as human minds can state it, new problems, arising almost
overnight, would encumber the ground again. . . . The law. . . must be ready for the
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Oral agreements otherwise unenforceable under the Statute are entered
into, relied upon, and performed every day.9 2 Indeed, many long-term

business relationships mature to the point where lucrative transactions
are routinely carried out on the faith of nothing more than an oral promise and a handshake.93 It is therefore empirically incorrect to state that it
is per se unreasonable to rely on certain oral promises. If reliance is

indeed factually unreasonable, a court should dismiss the fraud action on
the ground that the plaintiff has not proved the element of justifiable

reliance.9 4 Moreover, a policy that declares any reliance on certain oral
promises to be absolutely irremediable could have a detrimental effect on
the efficient functioning of the marketplace.

Invoking the Statute of Frauds to dismiss an otherwise meritorious
fraud claim not only creates a semantic anomaly, 95 it also unjustifiably
amplifies the Statute's already potent capacity for causing injustice.96
morrow." B. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 19-20 (1924). Therefore, when necessary
to further the purpose of both the common law and the Statute to prevent fraud in business dealings, courts should allow the common law fraud action to be predicated on a
promise the legislature has declared to be "void." See id. at 67 ("Hardly is the ink dry
upon [a statute] before the call of an unsuspected equity-the urge of a new group of
facts, a new combination of events-bids us blur and blot and qualify and even, it may be,
erase.").
91. See supra note 88. The tension between the Statute and the customs of trade has
long been recognized. See Leake, The Principles of Legislation Involved in the Statute of
Frauds, As It Affects the Law of Contracts, read before the Juridical Society (July 7,
1856), in Papers Read Before the Juridical Society: 1855-1859, at 271, 291 (London
1858). See supra note 88. Professor Leake observed:
If it comes to pass that men may act, almost habitually, in a manner which will
bring on them the penalties of the law, or at least deprive them of its protection,
and yet without any imputation of moral blame on the score of dishonesty or
even of negligence, it surely affords a strong argument to shew, that in such case
the law is in fault, and has attempted to guide the conduct of men in a wrong
direction: and such seems to be the case with the Statute of Frauds.
Leake, supra, at 291; see also Prosser and Keeton, supra note 10, § 108, at 751-52 (new
standard of business ethics, demanding that statements of fact be honestly made, has led
to shift away from law's presumption that only a fool expects common honesty). See infra
notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
92. See Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill.
160, 165-66, 103 N.E.2d 485, 488-89 (1952); Ned
Nastrom Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co., 338 NAV.2d 64, 70 (N.D.
1983); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-1, at 673. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
93. See, eg., Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 165-66, 103 N.E.2d 485, 488-89 (1952)
(custom in grain business to buy and sell grain by oral agreement); see also Ned Nastrom
Motors, Inc. v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co., 338 N.W.2d 64, 70 (N.D. 1983) (ten
years of prior oral dealing justified plaintiff's reliance on oral promise of defendant, whose
word was "'better than most men's checks' ").
94. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
95. It is inconceivable that either Parliament or any of the state legislatures intended
a statute expressly enacted to prevent fraud to operate as the sole barrier to compensation
of a bona fide fraud victim or, conversely, to constitute a fraudfeasor's last refuge from
liability for his conduct. See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text.
96. That the Statute of Frauds may unjustly deny recovery for the nonperformance of
an oral promise that was in fact made is the accepted price for deterring false claims of
oral promises. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. To permit the Statute to deny
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Theoretically, the fraud plaintiff may, in order to avoid unjust applica97
tion of the Statute, estop the defendant from asserting it as a defense.

Some courts require the claimant to show either unconscionable injury to
himself or unjust enrichment to the defendant.98 Others amorphously
require the claimant to show that application of the Statute would itself

operate a fraud upon him. 99 But because the elements of an estoppel are

relief in a case in which actual fraud has been legally established is to raise the price of
deterring sham allegations of oral promises to a level the legislature could not have contemplated. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
97. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 978, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345,
353 (1984). While acknowledging the potential for injustice inherent in sustaining the
Statute of Frauds as a defense to a fraud action, the Munoz court asserted that the avoidance of injustice is the function of an estoppel. See id. at 978, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 353. A
successful estoppel claim, however, results in enforcement of the contract in derogation of
the Statute's policy. See Ozier v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 163-65, 103 N.E.2d 485, 487-88
(1952); Good Samaritan Hosp. & Medical Center, 264 Or. 200, 207-09, 504 P.2d 749,
752-53 (1972) (McAllister, J., dissenting); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc.,
94 Wash. 2d 255, 260-61, 616 P.2d 644, 647 (1980).
An estoppel to assert the Statute can take one of three forms: promissory estoppel,
equitable estoppel, or part performance. See Note, Promissory Estoppel As A Means Of
Defeating The Statute Of Frauds, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 114, 120 (1975). The requirements for the three forms of estoppel frequently overlap and are sometimes contradictory.
For example, the requirements for an equitable estoppel, predicated in theory on a representation of fact made by the party seeking to assert the Statute, range from the identical
elements required to establish a cause of action for fraud, see Ozier v. Haines, 411111. 160,
163-64, 103 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1952), to the following comparatively minimal requirements: an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted;
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and injury to
the other party resulting from permitting the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act, see Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank, 38 Wash.
App. 50, -, 685 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1984) (quoting Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 85
Wash. 2d 78, 81, 530 P.2d 298, 300 (1975)). Alternatively, some courts require that any
acts in reliance on the action or representation asserted as the basis of the estoppel must
also be unequivocally referable to the alleged oral contract. See Margate Indus. v.
Samincorp, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 611, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This requirement is the dispositive criterion for enforcing the oral contract pursuant to the equitable doctrine of part
performance. See Clark v. Portland Trust Bank, 221 Or. 339, 355, 351 P.2d 51, 59 (1960)
(quoting 49 Am. Jur. Statute of Frauds § 428, at 734-35 (1943)). The elements of a promissory estoppel to assert the Statute, predicated on a party's detrimental reliance on a
promise, are set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139, at 354 (1979).
Some courts, however, modify these elements to require the promissory estoppel claimant
to show substantial injury tantamount to fraud, see Philo Smith & Co. v. USLIFE Corp.,
554 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (applying New York law), while others expressly hold that fraudulent conduct is not relevant to a promissory estoppel claim, see
Kiely v. St. Germain, - Colo. -, -, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (1983). Still others require both
unconscionable injury and part performance unequivocally referable to the alleged oral
agreement. See Long Island Pen Corp. v. Shatsky Metal Stamping Co., 94 A.D.2d 788,
789, 463 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (1983).
98. See, e.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623-24, 220 P.2d 737, 739-40
(1950); Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 974, 203 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350
(1984); see also Lovely v. Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485, 493, 347 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1984)
(Peterson, J., dissenting) (estoppel to assert Statute turns on either unjust enrichment to
party asserting Statute or unconscionable injury to party seeking to enforce contract).
99. See, e.g., Loeb v. Gendel, 23 Ill. 2d 502, 505, 179 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1961); Kent v. Bell,
374 Mich. 646, 654, 132 N.W.2d 601, 605 (1965); Yucca Mining & Petroleum Co. v.
Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 109 N.M. 281, 289, 365 P.2d 925, 930 (1961).

1985]

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

1247

at best inconsistently applied, 1co an estoppel to assert the Statute does not
provide effective protection against the Statute's use as an instrument of
fraud. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why a judge would prefer to
apply a vague and elusive notion such as estoppel rather than simply
require the plaintiff to establish the comparatively clear and objective elements of a fraud claim.
The two components of the Statute's antifraud policy-nonenforcement of oral contracts in order to deter fraud by a bogus promisee and
proscription of the Statute's employment to shield fraud by a promisorare difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile satisfactorily in the context of
a fraud action based on an oral promise within the Statute. No matter
which position a court ultimately adopts, the Statute's policies are compromised to some degree. Nevertheless, if the Statute is to remain a credible deterrent against fraud, it cannot constitute an absolute bar to a
common law fraud action.
II. THE APPROPRIATE RECOVERY
A.

Regardless of the Usual Measure of Damages, Recovery Should
Generally Be Limited to Out of Pocket Losses

Although the victim of a fraudulent oral promise within the Statute
must be allowed to recover in tort, the consequent opportunity for fraud
by a purported promisee cannot be ignored. Accordingly, the amount of
recovery must be computed in a manner consistent with the Statute's
mandate against enforcement of certain oral contracts.
The Statute bars enforcement of certain oral promises because such
°
claims have traditionally been permeated with fraud.""
The fact that
evidence of an oral promise is offered for the purpose of showing that it
was made with a fraudulent intent does not somehow make it more credible than when it is offered to show that it was subsequently dishonored." 2 Accordingly, permitting a fraud action based on an oral promise
within the Statute potentially allows both honest and dishonest plaintiffs
to circumvent the Statute's formal requirements and indirectly enforce
an unenforceable contract."' Thus, allowing such claims entails the risk
100. See, eg., Kiely v. St. Germain, - Colo. -, -, 670 P.2d 764, 768 (1983) (observing that "[a]lthough the doctrine of promissory estoppel is based in part upon the premise

that statute of frauds provisions need not defeat meritorious claims for enforcement of
oral promises, the results are far from uniform"); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 3839, 469 P.2d 177, 182 (1970) (Abe, J., dissenting) (complaining about unbridled judicial
discretion inherent in using estoppel to avoid injustice when plaintiff merely changed
position); see also Lovely v. Dierkes, 132 Mich. App. 485, 491, 347 N.W.2d 752, 754
(1984) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (objecting to discretionary invocation of estoppel to enforce oral contract because "[ilt adds nothing to justice or jurisprudence to allow ill-

defined claims to be submitted under ill-defined rules").
101. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.

103. See Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941) ("If the law
can be thus nullified by the transparent device of predicating a tort action upon the inva-
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of encouraging the type of fraud that initially led legislatures to deny

relief for the breach of such promises."0 4

Limiting a successful fraud plaintiff to a strict out of pocket recovery,
however, alleviates the risk of indirect enforcement of the contract. The
out of pocket rule is consistent with the basic goal of tort law in that it
puts the plaintiff in the same position in which he was before the fraud
was committed. 105 On the other hand, the standard measure of damages
for breach of contract is benefit of the bargain losses, which, in order to

compensate the expectancy interest, puts the plaintiff in the position in
which he would have been had the promise been performed.'0 6 Accordingly, because an out of pocket recovery is practically and theoretically
different from that obtained by enforcement of the contract, 0 7 permitting the fraud action does not defeat the policy underlying the Statute of

Frauds.108
lid oral promise . . . then the section might just as well be stricken from the statute.");
Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 439, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938)
(warning that "by this indirect method the statute of frauds would be nullified"); Wade v.
State Nat'l Bank, 379 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) ("To hold [the Statute
inapplicable to the fraud claim] would be to create an anomaly, and allow one to do
indirectly what he could not by law do directly.").
104. See Cohen v. Pullman Co., 243 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1957); Kroger v. Baur,
46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 803-04, 117 P.2d 50, 52 (1941); Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494, 499
(1873).
105. See, e.g., Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1103-04 (3d Cir, 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Seaboard Terminal & Refrigeration Co. v. Droste, 80
F.2d 95, 96 (2d Cir. 1935); General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184 F. Supp. 231,
235 (D. Minn. 1960); Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 9.2, at 595; Prosser and Keeton, supra note 10, § 110, at 76768.
106. See Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1104 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184 F. Supp. 231,
235 (D. Minn. 1960); Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 12.1, at 786. See supra note 29.
107. See D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 9.2, at 595-98.
108. See General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184 F. Supp. 231, 235 (D. Minn.
1960); Welch v. Lawson, 32 Miss. 170, 177-78 (1856); Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah
4.04, 411-13, 274 P. 856, 859-60 (1929).
The law of restitution provides an instructive analogy in support of permitting an out
of pocket recovery in fraud. As a general rule, the Statute does not bar a restitutionary
recovery of the value of benefits conferred upon the repudiating party. See J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 19-40, at 729; 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 321, at 155; D.
Dobbs, supra note 29, § 13.2, at 948; 3 S.Williston, supra note 3, § 534, at 812; Jeanblanc, Restitution Under The Statute Of Frauds: What ConstitutesA Legal Benefit, 26
Ind. L.J. 1, 39 (1950); Perillo, Restitution In A ContractualContext, 73 Colum. L. Rev.
1208, 1215-16 (1973). Just as in the case of an out of pocket recovery in tort, allowing a
restitutionary recovery despite the unenforceability of the underlying contract is not offensive to the Statute, because such a recovery differs in theory and in result from enforcement of the contract. See 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 321, at 157; D. Dobbs, supra
note 29, § 13.2, at 948-49; Jeanblanc, supra, at 2-4. The contract is admitted into evidence for a limited purpose: to show that the party conferring the benefit was not a
volunteer. D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 13.2, at 948-49; see Perillo, supra, at 1216. Moreover, because the Statute allows avoidance of the expectancy interest, the injured party is
not entitled to recover the benefit of the bargain; he may recover only the value of benefits
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Moreover, under the out of pocket rule, there is little incentive to bring
a spurious fraud claim as a means of avoiding the Statute: Even if successful, the disingenuous plaintiff realizes no profit." °9 Thus, an out of

pocket recovery in tort is consistent with the Statute's policy of deterring
fraudulent claims.11
Because permitting the fraud claim in jurisdictions that allow a benefit
transferred to the repudiating party. See 2 A. Corbin, supra note 3, § 321, at 157; D.
Dobbs, supra note 29, § 13.2, at 949; Jeanblanc, supra, at 4. Thus, a restitutionary recovery represents a compromise between the common law's policy against unjust enrichment
and the Statute's mandate against enforcement of certain oral contracts. See 2 A. Corbin,
supra note 3, § 321, at 157; D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 13.1, at 946, § 13.2, at 948; Jeanblanc, supra, at 2-4. Analogously, the rule proposed herein represents a compromise
between the policy against the Statute's operation as a shield for fraudulent conduct, see
supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text, and the policy of nonenforcement of certain
oral contracts, see supra note 4 and accompanying text. Because recovery of out of
pocket losses compensates only the reliance interest, the proposed rule still allows avoidance of the expectancy interest, as required by the Statute, except when fraud is so clearly
established that such avoidance is no longer justified. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
Although courts have traditionally allowed a restitutionary recovery only to the extent
of the value of benefits conferred upon the repudiating party, this concept of benefit is so
flexible as to be misleading, if not altogether meaningless. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
supra note 3, § 19-44, at 731; D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 13.2, at 955-57. For example, in
Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 500, 452 N.E.2d 1245, 465 N.Y.S.2d 917
(1983), the New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery for expenditures made by
plaintiff in reliance on defendant's oral promise to lease a building from plaintiff, who was
to complete its renovation and make modifications prior to defendant's taking possession.
See id. at 502-03, 452 N.E.2d at 1246, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 918. Contrary to the traditional
rule, the court held that the defendant need not benefit from plaintiff's efforts in order for
the latter to obtain restitution; the plaintiff may recover for those efforts that were to his
own detriment. See id. More significantly, the court also held the Statute of Frauds inapplicable to plaintiff's claim and rejected the dissent's position, see id. at 503.04, 452
N.E.2d at 1247, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 919, which would have barred plaintiff's claim on the
authority of Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 494 (1873), see Farash, 59 N.Y.2d at 508, 452
N.E.2d at 1249, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 921, one of the leading cases holding that the Statute
bars recovery in tort for a misrepresentation related to an oral agreement within the
Statute, see Nanos v. Harrison, 97 Conn. 529, 535, 117 A. 803, 805 (1922). The court
reasoned that whether the theory of recovery is called "acting in reliance" or "restitution," a promisee who incurs expense at a promisor's request should be allowed to recover, notwithstanding the unenforceability of the underlying agreement. Farash, 59
N.Y.2d at 506, 452 N.E.2d at 1248, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
Although Farash did not sue in fraud-possibly because he could not prove a lack of
intent to perform at the time the promise was made-the court's analysis applies to a
promissory fraud action and militates in favor of a rule that the Statute is not a bar to
recovery of out of pocket expenses. Because a restitutionary recovery does not require
any bad faith on the part of the repudiating party, a fortiori an out of pocket recovery in
tort should be permitted.
109. Because an out of pocket recovery merely restores to the plaintiff the amount he
lost in reliance on defendant's promise, see General Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 184
F. Supp. 231, 235 (D. Minn. 1960); Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974), he is only made whole and therefore gains nothing, see GeneralCorp., 184 F.
Supp. at 235; Collins, 511 S.W.2d at 747.
110. If a potential fraudfeasor stands to gain nothing from the action, he has little
reason to try to establish by perjurious testimony a promise that was never made. The
Statutes policy of discouraging spurious claims founded on perjured testimony is therefore advanced. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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of the bargain recovery for fraud could result in indirect enforcement of

oral contracts in derogation of legislative policy,1 1' a plaintiff in those
states who has proven a fraudulent oral promise within the Statute
should still be limited to an out of pocket recovery. 12 Similarly, in states
that technically follow the out of pocket rule but, under a liberal interpretation of consequential damages, nevertheless permit recovery of con-

tract-type damages, such as lost profits,

1

3

a successful fraud plaintiff

should also be limited to a strict out of pocket recovery.

Imposing a limit on recovery may deny a true fraud victim the full
measure of damages his jurisdiction allows;"

4

however, granting any re-

covery risks awarding damages to a person who may have introduced
perjured testimony in support of his claim" 5 as well as commensurately
harming a person fully within his rights in not performing an oral promise. "6 Nevertheless, these risks are preferable to the greater risks of pro-

moting fraud inherent in either granting a full benefit of the bargain
recovery'

17

or denying any recovery at all."I 8 Moreover, when the plain-

tiff is acting in good faith, limiting his recovery to his reliance damages is
not a grave injustice because he will have lost nothing. Therefore, limiting a successful fraud plaintiff to a strict out of pocket recovery most
effectively promotes the Statute's policies because it makes whole the
meritorious claimant and substantially deters the fraudfeasor.
111. See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 965, 977-78, 203 Cal. Rptr.
345, 353 (1984); Canell v. Arcola Hous. Corp., 65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953); Mildfelt v.
Lair, 221 Kan. 557, 566-68, 561 P.2d 805, 813-15 (1977); Cassidy v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corp., 285 Mich. 426, 439-40, 280 N.W. 814, 819 (1938).
112. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Price v. Mabrey, 231 Ark. 971, 974-76, 333 S.W.2d 724, 727-28 (1960);
Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 22-24, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606,
618-19 (1983). When explicitly adopted, this approach is referred to as the "flexible
rule," because it permits the courts, on a case-by-case basis, to allow whatever recovery
they deem just and proper under the circumstances. See D. Dobbs, supra note 29, § 9.2,
at 596-97; see, eg., Rice v. Price, 340 Mass. 502, 509-10, 164 N.E.2d 891, 895-96 (1960);
Zeliff v. Sabatino, 15 N.J. 70, 74-75, 104 A.2d 54, 56 (1954); Selman v. Shirley, 161 Or.
582, 609, 85 P.2d 384, 393-94 (1938). Lost profits should never be recovered under the
out of pocket rule, because under that theory of damages a successful plaintiff may not
improve his position by virtue of the fraud. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying
text.
114. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text. Although limiting recovery to
out of pocket losses is sufficient to deter the malicious, premeditated fraudfeasor from
bringing a bogus fraud claim in his quest for illegal profit, it is nevertheless possible that
someone who has negligently expended money in reliance on what he thought was a
binding oral agreement may, under this proposal, theoretically be able to use a bogus
fraud action to recoup those losses in derogation of the Statute.
116. See Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
117. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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Full FraudRecovery Is PermittedIf CollateralMisrepresentations
Are Proven

Although limiting the recovery in fraud actions based solely on an oral
promise within the Statute ensures that such claims will not result in

indirect enforcement of oral contracts, a successful fraud plaintiff should
be permitted to recover the full amount of his damages if he can prove
additional misrepresentations that are collateral to the oral promise.11 9

Proof of a collateral misrepresentation reduces the likelihood that the
plaintiff may be the defrauding party because it implies a comprehensive
scheme of fraud rather than a single, possibly inadvertent, misstatement. 120 Moreover, the existence of additional misrepresentations ren-

ders proof of the oral promise nonessential to the success of the fraud
action; 12 1 the plaintiff need not even plead it as part of his cause of action,"z thereby eliminating any basis for invoking the Statute.
119. Cf Weinacht v. Phillips Coal Co., 673 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984)
(plaintiff's fraud claim barred by Statute because alleged false oral promise did not relate
to collateral matter but rather to consideration for the unenforceable contract itself; Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (fraud action
barred by Statute because no collateral agreement alleged or proved and no attempt made
to establish any fraudulent acts other than oral promise to perform agreement and failure
to do so).
120. The Statute of Frauds' underlying premise is that the party alleging the making of
an oral promise is more likely than not acting in bad faith. See supra notes 3-5 and
accompanying text. The proof of other false statements made by the party denying the
making of the oral promise tends to vitiate this fictional presumption.
121. The Statute of Frauds precludes proof of certain oral promises by parol evidence.
See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. Accordingly, when there is no need to offer
proof of the oral promise, there is nothing for the Statute to preclude.
122. The claimant may predicate his fraud action entirely on the collateral misrepresentation and recover any damages flowing therefrom. This analysis may be what the
New York Court of Appeals intended when it held that
[i]f the proof of a promise or contract, void under the statute of frauds, is essential to maintain the action, there may be no recovery, but, on the other hand,
one who fraudulently misrepresents himself as intending to perform an agreement is subject to liability in tort whether the agreement is enforcible [sic] or
not.
Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 403, 408, 151 N.F2d 833,
836, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259, 263 (1958) (emphasis in original).
In Channel Master, defendant had falsely represented to plaintiff that it had enough
aluminum ingot to allow it to sell to plaintiff a specified quantity each month, and that it
was its intention to sell to plaintiff the specified quantity for a period of five years. Id. at
407, 151 N.E.2d at 834-35, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 262. Although the court never explained
what it meant by "proof of a promise or contract" within the Statute being "essential to
maintain the action," it may have meant to require as the basis for the fraud claim some
misrepresentation other than the promise within the Statute. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the court had a choice of two misrepresentations upon which
plaintiff relied to his detriment-one purely promissory and one a collateral misrepresentation of a condition necessary to performance of the underlying contract. The promissory misrepresentation: I promise to supply you with your requirement of aluminum
ingot for the next five years. See id. at 407, 151 N.E.2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 263. The
collateral misrepresentations: I possess enough aluminum ingot to meet your requirements and I have not contracted to sell to anyone such a quantity that would render it
impossible to meet your needs. See id at 407, 151 N.E2d at 835, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
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Thus, in jurisdictions that allow recovery of benefit of the bargain
damages or the equivalent in a fraud action, there is no reason to limit
the recovery to strict out of pocket losses, because the defendant's fraud12 3
ulent conduct and the plaintiff's good faith are more clearly evident.
No harm is done to the Statute's underlying policies when a genuine
fraud victim is compensated to the full extent prescribed by law.124 In-

deed, the possibility of a benefit of the bargain recovery may deter potential fraudfeasors from using the Statute as a shield against liability,12 5
thus buttressing the Statute's antifraud policy.
CONCLUSION

A fraud action predicated on an oral promise subject to the Statute of
Frauds accentuates the tension between the Statute's laudable objectives

and its controversial means of achieving them. Although this tension
can never be completely resolved, focusing on the available fraud remedy
offers a fair and practical solution that is consistent with the Statute's

policies.
Basic principles of justice and modem business practice dictate that
the Statute may not constitute an absolute bar to an action in tort for

fraud. To hold otherwise would be to invite corrupt individuals to employ the Statute as an instrument of their fraud, thereby subverting the
legislature's purpose in enacting the Statute. Moreover, because a strict
out of pocket recovery in an action predicated solely on the oral promise
does not put the plaintiff in the position in which he would have been had
the fraudulent promise been performed, allowing the fraud action will

not result in indirect enforcement of oral contracts within the Statute.
Furthermore, because a successful fraud plaintiff cannot profit from the
action, limiting recovery to direct pecuniary loss deters potential
fraudfeasors from enlisting the aid of the Statute. Although by no means
a panacea for the inequities inherent in construing the Statute of Frauds
Consequently, proof of the promissory misrepresentation was not essential in order to
maintain the tort action.
Under the approach proposed herein, proof of such collateral misrepresentations
would entitle the fraud plaintiff to recover the full extent of damages permitted in his
jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the fraud plaintiff proves only the fraudulent nonperformance of an oral promise within the Statute, his recovery would be limited to the
direct pecuniary loss he incurred in reliance thereon.
123. See supra note 120. Because the Statute's purpose is to prevent fraud, there is no
reason to limit the plaintiff's recovery when he is clearly the victim of the fraud-and not
the other way around, as the Statute presumes. When this presumption is factually invalid, the Statute should not preclude recovery. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text.
124. See supra notes 1-5, 63-64 and accompanying text.
125. As a matter of logic, if a potential fraudfeasor knows he may be forced to pay in
damages what his victim would have earned had the false promise been performed-in
other words, lost profits--he is less likely to make a fraudulent promise than if he faces
the prospect of paying only the victim's reliance expenditures, which can never include
lost profits.
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in the context of a fraud action, the proposed compromise approach most
effectively vindicates the Statute's fundamental policy of preventing
fraud.
George N. Stepaniuk

